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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this document is to investigate the effect of different distribution 
channel structures on volume software business in Hong Kong. This report will start 
with a case study of a US based software manufacturer in Hong Kong, then identify 
the economic models that capture the features of this business. 
Through scenario analysis of applying different channel strategies on the 
model, we will propose the optimal channel structure for the volume software 
distribution business in Hong Kong. 
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Automate is a leader in the development and marketing of computer aided design 
and drafting (CAD) software, primarily for the business and professional markets. The 
company's software products are sold worldwide, through a network of dealers and 
distributors. In 1997，Automate became the largest PC CAD (Computer Aided Design) 
and 3D-animation software company in the world, it is also on of the five largest software 
company worldwide^ 
Automate first started its business in 1982, by producing CAD software that runs 
on DEC PDP 11 minicomputers. Automate's first product AutoDraw was a simple 
electronic drawing board software that replaces traditional paper based drafting. Later, as 
Automate believed that IBM PC computer would dominate the computer market, it bet its 
fortune on IBM PC, and started porting its minicomputer-based software to the PC 
platform. From 1984 onwards, Automate mainly focus on producing CAD and 
multimedia software that runs on IBM PC computers. 
Like many software companies, Automate was started up by only a few young 
programmers. Right from the beginning, Automate used resellers as its sales vehicle; 
'Automate Annual Report 1997. 
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subsequent expansion was thus achieved through expansion of its reseller network to 
enlarge geographic coverage. 
In 1997, Automate has about 2445 employees, selling software to over 150 
countries. The revenue of Automate totaled over 500 million US dollars, with 40% of the 
revenue coming from Northern America, 34% from Europe and 26% from Asia Pacific. 
As of 1997，the total number of Automate's customers exceeded 3 million worldwide, and 
Automate's flagship product AutoDraw is also the world's best selling CAD package, 
with over 1.8 million installed units worldwide, a market share of over 60%. Automate 
also has a very strong presence in the multi-media and animation production industry. 
It's product 3D Workshop has a market share of over 75% in the videographic industry^. 
The Software Industry and Automate 
The software market can be segmented in different ways, like by area of 
applications, by hardware platforms, or by price. During our discussion, we will segment 
the market by the degree of uniformity of the end product. 
Software can be classified into different groups; namely, off-the-shelf software, 
customizable applications and tailor made applications. By off-the-shelf software, we 
refer to those software that are relatively simple, low price, well understood by end-users 
and are usually sold through retail stores�. Examples are Microsoft Windows and 
Microsoft Money etc. On the other hand, customizable applications are those software 
^Information extracted from Automate's Annual Report 1997. 
^Under the NAICS coding system, this segment of the software industry refers to software publishers, code 
51121. 
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that come in standard form, but can be enhanced to better fit end-users requirements. 
These applications are typically mid-range to high price, require more end-user training 
to use, and sold by resellers that provide product support. In some cases, consultant 
companies and developers may use customizable applications as building blocks to build 
solutions for end-users^. Examples are ACCPAC accounting package, and database 
applications. Finally, tailor made applications are those applications solely developed to 
meet a customer's need. Pricing of these applications may vary, but mostly lie in the 
high-range. Moreover, the software developers often sell these applications themselves^. 
The revenues from these three classes have undergone major changes in the past 
30 years. Before the 70s, almost all software packages are tailor made applications. 
During the 80s, there have been more and more customizable and off-the-shelf packages. 
However, since computer literacy of the general public is still low, tailor-made 
applications and customizable products still dominate the market. The volume software 
business started to flourish from 90s onwards as Apple and IBM PC has broken people's 
barrier to using computers. As a result, there are more and more off-the-shelf software 
applications in the market. As people's computer literacy rose, tailor made applications 
started to be replaced by customizable applications. 
Automate's flagship products lie in both the off-the-shelf and customizable 
groups. Some users may just purchase the products and use it as a standard application, 
while others may require more support and programming from dealers. 
^Under the NAICS coding system, this segment of the industry is referred to as 541512. 
5Under the NAICS coding system, this segment of the industry is referred to as 541511. 
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Automate,s Business Model - The Virtual Corporation 
The concept of the Virtual Corporation was first put forward by William Davidow 
and Michael Malone in 1992^ which states that, in order to cope with the current rapid 
changing technological and competitive conditions, business organizations need to be 
more flexible. One way to achieve high flexibility is to abandon the traditional reliance 
on internal hierarchy, instead, companies should continuously fashion relationships with 
independent vendors in the marketplace to provide downstream and peripheral products 
and services. 
This idea best summarizes Automate's business strategy. Automate believes that 
one of the key factor of its success is the leveraging of the distribution channel. By 
relying on the dealer channel on providing sales and technical services to end-users, 
Automate can maintain a very lean company size, and thus a lower overhead than its 
competitors. As a result, whenever there is price pressure, Automate can still stay at the 
competitive edge. 
There are three tiers in Automate's distribution channel, namely Automate, 
distributors and dealers. Automate ships its software products to the distributors, who 
then handle the logistics, broke the bulk and sell to dealers. The dealer then sells the 
product to end-users directly, who is also the user's direct contact point for after-sales 
service. 
In order to secure the internal fit^ of the virtual corporation, Automate has made 
clear that it wouldn't compete with its dealers, instead, it would depend heavily on the 
^Davidow, W.H. and M,S, Malone, The Virtual Corporation, New York; HarperBusiness, 1992. 
^The term internal fit generally refers to the harmonic working environment inside a corporation. 
5 
dealer channel to provide hardware, product support and consultation services to the end-
users. Automate would not engage in direct sales activities, all its efforts would be 
devoted to product development, marketing support and channel support. 
Automate 
； 丨 丨 i — ~ ~ ； _ _ _ 
Distributor Distributor Distributor 
i ' i : | I | ~ ^ i 
Dealer Dealer Dealer Dealer 
Reseller Reseller 
i , i — ^ _ _ _ L ^ 
End-User End-User End-User 
• Formal Channel 
Informal Channel 
Figure 1 Distribution Channel Structure ofAutomate 
Automate put forward the idea that, Automate itself is not a solution provider. 
Instead, viewing Automate and the dealer channel as a whole to serve end-users forms a 
virtual corporation. By 1997, Automate has over 4,100 resellers worldwide, and 
maintains a customer to employee ratio of over 1200^. An average of 80% of the revenue 
from AutoDraw related sales (including software, hardware and consultant service) was 
kept in the dealer channel, and Automate's profit only made up 20% of the revenue^. 
^Information extracted from Automate Annual Report 1997. 
^Information extracted from the keynote speech of Automate's CEO in the dealer conference CADCAMP '97. 
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Automate's strong commitment on the virtual corporation was rewarded by the 
dealer channels support. Feeling very safe that Automate would not steal their customers 
or compete with them in the future, resellers are very comfortable in promoting 
Automate's products to end-users. Moreover, since Automate has already made clear that 
it wouldn't step into side business of CAD in the future, independent vendors are willing 
to invest in developing and providing complimentary products, like teaching materials 
and utility software, for Automate's products. All these add up to enhanced popularity of 
Automate's products and dominant market share. 
Besides selling new licenses of software packages, one forth of Automate's 
revenue comes from upgrades'®. In order to maintain a high upgrade rate, Automate must 
ensure that users' software competence level must be improved constantly, so that they 
would demand more advanced functionality, as well as appreciate the added features in 
new software releases. Thus, Automate relies heavily on dealers to provide technical 
support to end-user in order to boost up user's technical competence. 
Distribution Channel Development History in Hong Kong 
During 1984 and 1986 Automate's presence in Asia Pacific is very little. There 
was basically no formal reseller channels in Asia Pacific, any company can purchase 
products from Automate in US and then resell to its customers. 
'°Upgrade is a very special offer Automate gives its' existing customers. Existing customers can exchange 
their old version product to the latest version by paying only one-sixth of the software price. 
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In 1987，in view ofthe rapid growth of business opportunities in Asia Pacific, 
Automate setup a specific task force to look after business development in Asia. During 
that year Automate appointed distributors in all Asian countries, these distributors then 
signup their own resellers, thus a formal distribution network is formed. 
Under the distribution agreement, distributors are bind to sell only to authorized 
dealers they have signed. Moreover, they also have to commit on revenue quota. In 
return, all distributors have exclusive dealership in their respective regions. 
In early 90's, more then 10% of Automate's revenue were came from Asia Pacific. 
In order to sustain this rapid growth, Automate started setting up subsidiary offices in the 
region. By 1996, Automate has office in Japan, Korea, Singapore, China, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, India and Australia. These offices are mainly marketing offices that never engage 
in direct sales. The major function of these country offices is to provide marketing and 
technical support to local distribution channel. Through these country offices, Automate 
can obtain a better understanding of each market, and thus has better control and monitor 
of the local distribution channel". 
In 1987, Atoz, a local computer hardware trader, signed up its distribution 
agreement with Automate as the sole distributor in Hong Kong. At that time, Atoz 
recruited 10 dealers. 
Automate's Hong Kong office was setup in 1993, staffed with 4 people. The first 
thing this office did was adding two more distributors into the existing channel, namely 
SiS and Laser Computer who are much larger than Atoz in business size. In 1993, 
"Extracted from an interview with Mr. E. Cheung, Country Manager, Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
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Automate's revenue in Hong Kong was around 800K US dollars, while in 1996, this 
number exceeded 3 million US dollars. 
Today, Automate's channel in Hong Kong consists of 3 distributors, 25 authorized 
dealers and over 50 resellers. Automate does not sell direct in Hong Kong, and all sales 
are done through the channel. Authorized dealers are appointed by Automate, but can 
purchase freely from any of these three distributors. Resellers, on the other hand, are 
smaller companies that have no formal relationship with Automate or these three 
distributors. Resellers can also purchase software from the three distributors, but usually 
enjoy a discount less than authorized dealers. 
In 1997，sales of Automate's products in Hong Kong are evenly spread through 
the three distributors. About 50% of the business are from authorized dealers, while the 
other 50% are from resellers. Among 25 authorized dealers, only 5 are active volume 




In this section, we will use Michael Porter's five forces analysis model^^ to study 
the environment in which Automate operates in Hong Kong. After getting a macro view 
ofthe industry, we will then present analysis of each party in particular. 
According to Michael Porter's approach, five forces have to be considered when 
analyzing an industry or company's competitiveness, namely, internal rivalry, entry, 
substitute products, supplier power and buyer power. 
Software Market in General 
Our discussion of the software market will be confined to the software publishing 
business. As we have mentioned before, this market began to flourish at the beginning of 
90s due to the popularity ofIBM PC and Apple computers. Moreover, we will focus our 
discussion in the Hong Kong region only. 
i2porter，M. Competitive Strategy, New York: Free Press, 1980. In his book, Porter presented a simple 
framework for exploring the economic factors (five) that affect the profits of an industry. 
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Internal Rivalry 
The software market has undergone several evolutions during the past twenty 
years. During late 80s and early 90s the competition in the software market is severe. 
Customers are not so knowledgeable about computer at that time, and viewed software 
from each vendor as close substitutes. As a result, a few players in each market evenly 
divide market shares. For example in the word processing market, applications like MS 
Word, WordStar, Word Perfect and AmiPro divided the market almost equally. In the 
CAD market, the picture is even more fragmented. 
However, as we stepped into mid 90s, the market converged to only one or two 
leading applications in each field. For example, MS Excel became the defacto standard 
of spreadsheet applications, while MS Word dominated the word processing market. 
However, in some areas battles are still going on. The major reason for this convergence 
is the wide spread of personal computer. As more people are using computer, the inter-
exchange of electronic information becomes very frequent. Thus, people started noticing 
that a common file format is essential, which means, they have to compromise on using a 
unique application for each task. 
Nowadays, the concentration ratio in the matured software market is very high; 
market shares are typically in the hands of one or two companies. By matured markets, 
we refer to areas like word processing, spreadsheet, personal databases, e-mails and 
network connectivity. Thus, we would say software vendors in these markets are facing 
little competition. 
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However, there are some emerging markets like desktop publishing, computer 
graphics and personal assistant, vendors are going through the early stage ofthe product 
life cycle. 
Entry 
The software business involves very low set-up as well as R&D costs. As a 
result, there are numerous new software coming out each year (examples are Netscape, 
Visio etc). Moreover, independent small developers also benefit from the excellent 
marketing opportunities offered by the Intemet^^ thus the entry barrier to the software 
market is lowered. However, as we have mentioned in the previous section, major 
players, like Microsoft and Lotus have already monopolized the matured software 
market, new entries are only possible in niche markets. 
The reason for this is really simple, sizes of the installed base. Since most 
software uses its own proprietary file format", if a user has been using that particular 
software for a long time, the legacy data accumulated would naturally become a 
hindrance for him to switch to other applications. User's dependency would then shield a 
software from outside competition. 
'^Small software developers can advertise and sell their software through Internet at a very low cost, but 
covering a very wide group of potential customers. 
' % general, software developers would not publish the definitions of the data file format they use. As a 
result, it is almost impossible for other developers to design software that can read data stored in another application's 
format. 
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One common tactics for new entry to get into a matured market is to provide data 
compatibility to market leading software^^ However, in emerging markets, the installed 
base is small and so the volume of legacy data is little. Thus the hurdle for users to try 
and switch between application is low. As a result, we can see many small firms 
competing in those markets. Also, using a software involves relation specific investment 
from users. Users have to spend time and money to get trained on an application before 
he can use it productively. The longer a user use it, the more proficient he would be, but 
at the same time the opportunity cost for him to switch to another application becomes 
higher. The same token would also be applicable to corporations, who may have to 
spend tremendous amount of money in re-training, and suffer long down time, if they 
decide to change a mission critical software application. 
Substitutes 
Software are automation tools, in a lot of cases, they are developed to streamline 
the way in which people perform repetitive tasks. Thus, it would be relatively difficult to 
find substitutes for them. 
However, there is a thread from piracy, which serve as a substitute to legal 
software. Though a lot of efforts have been made in fighting against software piracy in 
Hong Kong, it is still a major issue to software vendors. In 1992, several software 
developers, lead by Microsoft, Lotus and Automate formed the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA), with the mission to fight against software piracy. 
'^For example, when Microsoft first introduced MS Word, Word provides users with the ability to read their 
existing WordPerfect data files. 
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Due to the efforts of the Hong Kong Customs and BSA, the piracy rate has 
lowered a lot during recent years, however, more than 70% of users in Hong Kong are 
still using illegal copies'^. 
Buyer Power 
Installed base is the greatest asset of software companies, thus for newly released 
software; they will do whatever they can to enlarge installed base. In this case, software 
vendors would provide great incentives to bait influential accounts like government 
departments and large corporations, to switch to their applications. In this aspect, we 
would say that buyers are very powerful. 
If software vendors can plant their seeds in influential accounts, then that 
accounts downstream companies or sub-contractors would have no choice but use the 
same software, in order to maintain data inter-exchangeability with their client. If 
software vendors can achieve this goal, buyer's power is lost. 
Moreover, after a user has adopted a software package, and created tons and tons 
of legacy data in that package's format, it would then be extremely difficult for him to 
switch to other packages. At this point, he has almost lost all his bargaining power. 
'^Figure estimated by the legal counsel of Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
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Supplier Power 
Software are intangible goods, thus it is very difficult to identify who is the 
industry's supplier. However, there are two forces which affects the development of a 
software company, namely, human resources and government regulation. 
Software is a very 'labor” htensive industry; programmers, system analysts and 
development directors often represent powerful suppliers. A software vendor's success 
depends largely on the quality of its development team, as well as the validity of the 
vision of the development director. The skill set of these personnel are highly portable, 
though, they leam to work in teams, but seem to be able to adjust rapidly to new 
environment. Thus, it is not uncommon for talented system analysts to realize real annual 
wage increase of over 30 percent. 
Government regulation is also a threat to the industry, like the Anti-trust law in 
US. Fortunately, these types of laws are non-existence in Hong Kong. 
Table 1 Competitive Analysis of Software Industry 
_ Forces Threat to Profit 
Internal Rivalry Low/High 
Entry Low/High 
Substitutes High 
Supplier Power High  
Buyer Power Low/High  
Automate 
We will use a similar model in the prevailing section to analyze the 
competitiveness of Automate in the market. 
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Competition and new entrant 
Automate has software product offerings in both matured markets and emerging 
markets. In the AEC (Architectural Engineering and Construction) and Mechanical and 
Manufacturing engineering field, Automate's flagship product AutoDraw is almost the 
defacto standard, having more than 80% of the market share. Major competitor in this 
market is MacroStation marketed by Intergraph Ltd^^ The business model of Intergraph 
is totally different from Automate's. Automate sells through dealer channel, and most of 
its revenue comes from the volume market. On the other hand, Intergraph adopts a direct 
sales approach, targeted mainly at utility companies, government departments and large 
major accounts. Moreover, large corporate accounts also requires more sophisticated 
support service, as a result, Intergraph has to maintain a much larger technical support 
team than Automate. 
Automate's concept of virtual corporation enables it to maintain a smaller head 
count and thus a lower overhead cost, whenever there comes price competition, Automate 
can still stay at the competitive edge. Moreover, Automate's huge installed base in the 
matured market serves as a strong shield against competitions and new entrant in this 
market. 
However, in emerging markets like GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and 
FM (Facilities Management), Automate is an absolute newcomer. Automate shipped its 
first GIS software in 1996, as a complimentary product to AutoDraw. Sales in this 
market are insignificant to Automate, but growth in the GIS market is very promising. 
Automate's advantage is definitely the huge installed base of AutoDraw, while its 
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weakness is lack of reference account and weak functionality. As we have mentioned 
below, new comers in emerging market are facing all kinds of hardship. 
Threat of Substitutes 
Like other software vendors, the major substitutes to Automate's products are 
pirated software. A rough estimation by Business Software Alliance (BSA) claimed that 
AutoDraw has more than 100,000 installed units in Hong Kong, while the number of 
actual legal license is only around 10,000.)8 
In 1997, the Hong Kong government passed an act against software piracy, such 
that using illegal software in business context is considered as a criminal act. As a result, 
the piracy problem should be under control in the coming years. 
The Automate Hong Kong office also faces the problem of parallel imports. Due 
to different market conditions in Asia Pacific, Automate prices its software separately in 
different countries, for example, AutoDraw's retail price in China is only 80% of this 
price in Hong Kong, while in Thailand the price is even only one third of that in Hong 
Kong. As a result, some resellers or even distributors would import Automate products 
from other countries and sold them in Hong Kong. 
Buyer Power 
Buyers ofAutomate can be classified into two types, end-users and resellers. Due 
to the popularity ofAutoDraw, Automate has great power over its dealer channel. 
'^Information provided by Mr. E. Cheung, Country Manager, Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
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To over 80% of the dealers, the profit from selling AutoDraw may not be too 
significant, however, a major portion comes from the business leveraged from selling 
AutoDraw, like hardware, consultant service and maintenance. To conclude, they would 
do their best to keep their status as an Automate authorized dealer. 
On the end-user side, as we have mentioned earlier, the AEC and Mechanical 
market have been using Automate's products for more than 10 years. The huge installed 
base，the number of personnel trained, as well as the volume of legacy data secured 
Automate's position in these two markets. 
In these two markets, we would conclude that buyer's power is weak. 
However, in emerging markets like GIS, Automate is in a weak position. To 
enter this market, capturing a few influential accounts is critical. As a result, buyer's 
power here is very strong. 
Supplier Power 
Automate Hong Kong is reselling software products developed by Automate, Inc 
in US. Being a subsidiary office, it is not facing much supplier threat. 
Table 2 Competitive Analysis of Automate 
Forces Threat to Profit 
Competition and New Entrant Low/High 
Substitutes High 
Buyer Power Low/High 
Supplier Power Low 
'^Estimates provided by Ms R. Durkee, Paralegal, Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
18 
Channel - Distributors 
In this section, we will use Automate's distributors as models to analysis the 
software distributor's business in Hong Kong. 
Distributors lie in the middle layer of Automate's model of virtual corporation. 
The major functions of distributors in the virtual corporation include, credit advancing, 
warehousing and in-boundA)ut-bound logistics. They are also responsible for the 
recruitment of dealers and resellers, and according to their agreement with Automate, 
they are not allowed to sell directly to end-users. 
Besides carrying Automate's products, these three distributors also distribute other 
computer hardware and software. But their agreement with Automate restricted them 
from distributing direct competing products from other software vendors. 
Competition and new entrant 
At present, Automate has three distributors in Hong Kong, and all of them are 
under the protection that Automate would not sell to anyone other than these three 
companies. However, they do complete severely among themselves. Since they do not 
provide any marketing and support functions, they usually compete on credit terms and 
price; as a result, scale of economy is the only key to win. Normally, they offer 30 days 
credits to dealers and resellers, while keeping a 3-5% gross margin for them. Their 
distributorship of other hardware and software also helps them compete for dealers and 
resellers. 
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As of 1997，market shares among the three distributors are not even, the two 
larger companies; Laser Computer and SiS got 40% each, while the smaller one Atoz has 
only 20% share of the market. 
New entrants are prohibited in three ways. First of all, before their agreements 
with Automate expire, Automate cannot add new distributor. Secondly, major 
distributors in the market are often carrying other Automate competing products; if they 
are to switch over, they must give up their existing distributorship. Finally, their existing 
dealer and reseller network can serve as a competitive asset against other new entrants. 
However, setting up the infrastructure for software distribution is easy. As we 
have mentioned before, no market specific investment is required, thus if anyone of the 
existing three distributors do not perform, it would be very easy for Automate to sign-up 
new ones as replacements. This can be a constant threat to the existing distributors to 
keep good relationship with Automate. 
Threat ofSubstitutes 
Subsidiary office of Automate in some countries does practice the two tiers 
channel structure, instead of the three-tier structure in Hong Kong. By two tiers, 
Automate subsidiary offices sell directly to dealers and resellers. 
However, in Hong Kong, there is no incentive for Automate to eliminate this 
middleman. Firstly, the margin distributors keep is just 3-5%, saving from eliminating 
them are small. Secondly, Automate can maintain a steady revenue stream by controlling 
the inventory level of the distributors. Finally, by off-loading all the credit control and 
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logistics to distributors, the operating overhead as well as head count can be kept at a 
minimal in the Automate Hong Kong office. 
To conclude, threat from substitution is low. However, as we have mentioned in 
the previous section, distributors would also face the threat of parallel imports, especially 
from other distributors in Thailand and China. 
Buyer Power 
Since distributors don't sell direct, dealer and resellers would be considered as the 
buyers. Dealers and resellers are allowed to purchase from any distributor, and since the 
shop around cost is very low, so distributors do have to compete for dealers. 
Currently, there are about 20 Automate dealers and over 50 resellers in Hong 
Kong. It is extremely easy for a distributor to contact and negotiate with each dealer, 
making the market very competitive. Moreover, in order to enjoy maximum bargaining 
power, dealers and resellers usually purchase from more than one distributor. 
Buyer power is very strong for distributors. 
Supplier Power 
All distributors have a single supplier, Automate. Due to the huge installed base 
and popularity of AutoDraw, Automate is at a very strong supplier position compared to 
other software vendors. As we have pointed out earlier, Automate's cost of adding and 
deleting a company from the list of distributors is low, relationship specific investment 
made by Automate is little. Moreover, by having three distributors in Hong Kong, good 
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balance ofpower is maintained by Automate, as a result bargaining power of distributor 
is thin. 
In short, supplier power is strong. 
Table 3 Competitive Analysis of Distributors 
Forces Threat to Profit  
Competition and New Entrant High/Low 
Substitutes Low 
Buyer Power High  
Supplier Power High  
Channel - Dealers and Resellers 
Dealers and resellers are the sales arms of the virtual corporation. They can be 
considered as the sales force for distributors and Automate. While viewing from the end-
user's side, they are the agents representing Automate. Currently, there are twenty 
authorized dealers in Hong Kong, to be an authorized dealers, their marketing and 
support capabilities must pass the requirements lay down by Automate. Resellers, on the 
other hand, do not have any formal business relationships with either Automate or its 
distributors. They are either box-movers or small trading companies, the formers are 
software distribution companies who provide little or no technical support, but offers 
deep discount to end-users. For the small traders, their sales volumes are just too low to 
justify investing in Automate products. The estimated number of resellers is over one 
hundred. 
Only authorized dealers are entitled to marketing and technical support provided 
by Automate, for example, they would be listed on all Automate's advertisements, they 
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are entitled to technical support from Automate and they can participate in all marketing 
events organized by Automate. Resellers are not covered by any marketing campaigns of 
Automate. 
Competition and new entrant 
Dealers and resellers compete in different ways. Dealers differentiate themselves 
by industrial expertise and service, while resellers compete by cutting price. Dealers 
build up their industrial knowledge by specializing in different vertical markets, mainly 
AEC, mechanical, videographic，GIS, government and education accounts. By 
specializing�they can provide high value added service and consultation to companies in 
that market. 
On the contrary, resellers would just compete by cutting price deeply, but provide 
no support service at all. Some dealers may match the price cut by reducing the amount 
of service provided, while others would emphasis the value of support services to 
customers, and charge premium on the services provided accordingly. 
End-users are cunning enough to take advantage of both types of retailers. They 
purchase some licenses from dealers who provide support, and the rest from discount 
resellers. Thus, they can enjoy the savings from buying from box-moving resellers, while 
drawing support from premium seeking dealers]9 
We would conclude that, if a retailer just sell plain AutoDraw box, he could only 
expect a very thin margin. The only way he can ask premium is providing add-on 
'^This type of free-riding is possible in software industry, due to the fact that it is impossible for the dealers to 
appropriate support services to individual pieces of software sold. 
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services, the harder are the services for others to match, the higher he can charge. As a 
result, some dealers don't focus much on software sales; instead, they devote all their 
efforts in providing custom made solutions, where they can charge high consultation fees. 
Threat of Substitutes 
In Hong Kong, Automate only sells through its dealer channel, unlike in the 
States where users can purchase through mail order or through Internet. Thus, the threat 
of substitutes is low. 
Buyer Power 
Due to user's investment in Automate's products, it would be difficult for them to 
switch to other software packages. Moreover, the budget on software spending when 
compared to the total project sum is often insignificant, so Automate clients are 
considered less price sensitive. 
As BSA and the Hong Kong Customs are more active in software anti-piracy 
campaigns, piracy in the business context should be gradually improved. There is 
increasing pressure on end-users to abandon their pirated copies and convert to legal 
license. We can see that buyer's power in this market is weak. 
Supplier Power 
Supplier power is low. Since dealers and resellers are the sales arms of the virtual 
corporation, their relationship with the customers can be considered as a valuable asset. 
So dealers with larger customer base would be at a better bargaining position with the 
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distributors. Moreover, the competition among distributors also lowered the bargaining 
power towards dealers. 
Table 4 Competitive Analysis of Dealers and Resellers 
Forces Threat to Profit 
Competition and New Entrant High 
Substitutes Low 
Buyer Power Low  




In this section, we will try to represent the Automate virtual corporation with 
structure models, in doing so; we aim to clarify the various relationships between 
different parties. We will also identify the types of competition they are facing. 
The Product Line - A Economic Perspective 
The value chain^® of Automate's products can be summarized as follows. 
Automate sells software package to distributors, distributors then add values of in-bound 
and out-bound logistics, products are then passed on to dealers and resellers. Resellers 
sell the goods to users by adding values of sales activities. For dealers, they will add 
values like pre-sales and after-sales support to the product. In some cases, dealers also 
provide custom made solutions to customers; in this case, they add development 
(manufacturing) values to the final product. 
Figure 2 depicts the value chain of Automate's products. 
20The concept ofvalue chain is also developed by Michael Porter in his book Competitive Advantage. Porter 
uses the value chain to describe the activities within firms and across firms that add value along the way to the ultimate 
transacted good or service. 
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Figure 2 Value Chain of the Automate Virtual Corporation 
The product offerings available to end-users can be classified into three types, 
namely, software package, software and support service bundle and complete solution. 
Currently, no dealer is selling support service alone. 
As we have mentioned earlier, profit margin is the thinnest for strict product 
selling, typically 5 - 10% of the retail price. By adding support services, dealers can 
charge higher prices, usually 20% - 30% of the retail price. Finally, solution selling 
would be the most profitable business, profit margin ranges from 100% to 1000% ofthe 
software retail price. Needless to say, investment is directly proportional to profit 
margin. 
Resellers who are just moving software boxes, don't need to invest much, usually 
they employ sales forces who sell a wide range of products including computer hardware 
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and software. The marginal cost of adding a new item in the product mix is low. On the 
other hand, fixed cost involved in selling product support service is high. Investment in 
human resources is required in order to provide product support services. Moreover, this 
investment is relationship specific, a support personnel specialized in one software may 
not switch to support other software packages easily, while provides the same level of 
support quality. On the other hand, the variable cost of selling support service to 
additional customers is low. 
Finally, solution selling provides the greatest earning opportunity. However, 
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Figure 3 1997 Revenue Composition. 
selling cycle of solution is much longer than software selling. Greater investment is also 
required. 
In 1997，total revenue from the three different sales is depicted in figure 3^^ We 
can see that revenue from solution selling is almost the same as that from product selling. 
However, this picture does not reflect Automate's interest. 
^'information provided by Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
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Consider the profit Automate obtained from these three sales in 1997. Unlike 
distribution in the total revenue, most of Automate's revenue is contributed by support-
^ ^ B ^ ^ m p : 
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Figure 4 1997 Profit Composition. 
stripped product sales. The reason of this discrepancy is due to the fact that, software 
costs usually take up less than 10% ofthe whole project sum in solution sales. 
Due to this reason, if Automate is to increase its profitability, it should increase 
income from product sales instead of solution sales. 
Market Structure and Competition 
The organization of the virtual corporation has undergone major changes in the 
past ten years. These changes were responses to growth of Automate's business in Hong 
Kong and changes in customers' need. 
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Before 1988 
Before 1988，Automate did not have any infrastructure in Hong Kong. Local 
architectural firms and consultants bought directly from Automate US, or dealers in US. 
Sales at that time are relatively small, around US$ 200K per annum.^^ 
1988 -1993 
In 1988, Automate signed up the first distributor in Hong Kong, Atoz. Atoz was 
given an exclusive right to distribute Automate products in Hong Koiig, and all dealers 
and resellers must order from Atoz. 
Due to Atoz's exclusive distribution right, a monopolistic price is charged, and a 
profit margin as high as 20% was retained. Moreover, this channel structure has the 
typical double marginalization problem. 
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Figure 5 Automate 's Channel Structure (1988 -1993) 
The average growth rate of sales during 1988 and 1993 was only 10% per year. 
The limited financial capacity and the narrow coverage of the dealer network were found 
to be the factors hindering sales growth^^. 
1993 -1996 
In viewing of the bottleneck imposed by Atoz on the software sales growth. 
Automate set up its own subsidiary office in Hong Kong. The main purpose of setting up 
this office is to provide better marketing and technical support to the local channel, as 
well as assists headquarters to better understand local market conditions. 
23Comments made by Mr. E. Cheung, Country Manager, Automate Hong Kong Ltd. 
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The first restructuring Automate Hong Kong office did is opening up the 
distributing channel. In 1993, Automate appointed two additional distributors in Hong 
Kong. These two distributors are much larger in business size and have already 
established strong dealer network for distribution of other hardware and software 
products. 
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Figure 6 Automate's Channel Structure (1993 -1996) 
The new channel structure has brought significant pricing changes within the 
virtual corporation. 
Due to competition, the profit margin of distributors dropped from 20% to 10 -
5% of the retail price. Being larger in business size, SiS and Laser were able to offer 
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deeper discount to dealers than Atoz. As a result, market share was unevenly distributed 
among the three. SiS and Laser both got around 37%, while Atoz only has 25%. 
As we have pointed out earlier, there is a difference in cost structure between 
resellers and dealers. Resellers provide no technical support to end-users, while dealers 
sell product and support services bundles. Due to this difference, resellers compete with 
dealers by lowering the end-user price, typically by 5%. As a result, dealers also have to 
cut their prices. 
Dealers and resellers shared the market equally. Which reflected that there is a 
significant portion of users who would prefer support-stripped products. 
Adding more distributors solves the double-marginalization problem. The effect 
is reflected by the fact that, Automate's revenue grew from US$ 800K in 1993 to US$ 3M 
in 1996, which means an average annual growth rate of 50%. 
Distributor's business also changed from a monopoly to a Coumot competition^^. 
Despite SiS and Laser are keeping a low profit margin ofonly 5% ofthe retail price, Atoz 
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Figure 7 Revenue Growth ofAutomate 
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marks up by 10%，still Atoz got 20% of the market share. The reason is simple. When 
dealers have reached their credit limits in SiS and Laser, they started buying from Atoz 
thus still kept Atoz in business. Moreover, in order to maintain balance of power, both 
Automate and the dealers would like to maintain more than two distributors. So, in a lot 
ofoccasions, Automate should mention Atoz in front of major accounts. 
Dealers business also changed from a monopolistic competition environment to a 
nearly perfectly competitive market. Dealers and reseller could only maintain a thin 
economic profit. The reason why dealers, with a greater overhead, still compete in such a 
low margin market is because they can leverage from Automate's dealership. By being 
Automate's authorized dealers, they can sell thick margin services like technical support, 
consultation and complete solution. 
Although, during these three years, Automate experienced tremendous growth, 
there are new problems brought about by this new channel structure. First of all, as we 
have mentioned in chapter I, one forth of Automate's revenue comes from software 
upgrades. The volume of upgrade business is highly dependent on user's utilization of 
the software package, which in turn is affected by the knowledge level of user on 
Automate's software. Since Automate depends heavily on the channel to provide training 
and technical support to end-users, a high level of channel competence is preferred. 
Moreover, Automate is also diversifying into the GIS and FM markets. More channel 
investment is needed in order to develop these emerging markets. 
24八 competition model put forward by A. Coumot in 1897，which stated that the sole strategic decision of 
each firm in this model is the amount they choose to produce. 
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1996 onwards 
Instead of aligning with Automate's objective, the current channel is hindering 
Automate's growth. Since dealers are facing perfect competition from resellers, very few 
dealers are willing to invest on Automate's products. As a result, deteriorating channel 
competence level is obvious. 
Automate  
p 3 U ^ ~ 
p - - — - - - | 6 0 % 
i i i ±  
Atoz SiS Laser —— 
r 6 o % ~ n 5 % ~ n ^ ~ 
68% 
z I i  




75% �f ^ r  
End User End User • “ 
Figure 8 Automate's Channel Structure Since 1996 
Automate intends to boost up channel's competence level by maintaining an 
abnormal profit for dealers. A special rebate of 10% of the retail price was given to all 
dealers, in doing so; they should still maintain a 15% profit margin when competing with 
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resellers. With this extra cost advantage, Automate expects that dealers would increase 
their investment on supporting Automate's products. 
From figure 8, we can notice that the 10% rebate is actually a 10% increase in 
distributor's price if the product goes to resellers. Automate required distributors to 
proceed dealer's purchase order when they order software from Automate, if they cannot 
show dealer's purchase order, then Automate would assume that the product ordered 
would be sold to a reseller, and thus would charge the dealer a higher price. 
The first effect of this new arrangement was increased street price. Since the 
purchase price of resellers is higher now, they have to charge users' a higher price. 
Instead of offering users a 25% discount, they can only afford a 15% discount now. 
From the model we can see that by offering end-users a 20% discount, dealers are at a 
competitive edge over the resellers. However, due to intra-dealer competition, dealers 
are not able to raise their prices. 
Financial results in 1997 showed that Automate's revenue is unaffected by this 
increase in street price. In 1997, Automate's total revenue was US$ 3.3M, an almost 
growth of 10% compared with the sales in 1996. This figure reflected that Automate 
users are price inelastic at this point. When we take a closer look at the ratio of dealer 
sales to resellers' sales, another interesting phenomena is revealed. In 1996，the revenue 
mix is 50% dealer and 50% reseller. In 1997，the ratio is only slightly improved to 60% 
dealer and 40% reseller, showing that even the retail price offered by dealers is 5% lower 
than that of resellers, only a small portion (around 20%) of resellers' sales were captured 
by dealers. This showed that, besides cost of goods advantage, resellers have certain 
infra-structural advantage over dealers. Some possible competitive strength of resellers 
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over dealers are, better market coverage, higher quality sales force and synergy from 
carrying a wide scope ofproducts. 
Due to the fact that the new channel pricing can only shift 20% of reseller's sales 




In this section, we will discuss various growth opportunities of Automate in Hong 
Kong, and what factors would contribute to Automate's success in capturing these 
opportunities. We will start our discussion by reviewing Automate's growth pattem in 
the past few years, then we will identify various external market changes, and finally, we 
will discuss how Automate can extend its product offerings to cope with the new market 
trends. 
Growth Projections 
Automate's revenue growth is shown in figure 9，we can see that for the past five 
years, Automate is able to maintain growth rates over 10% per year. However, the 
annual growth rate is deteriorating, from 250% in 1994 to 10% in 1997. 
Automate has kept its products' prices constant over the past five years, thus we 
can conclude that the growth attained is through increased number of units sold. The 
growth in number of seats sold can be explained by a few factors. 
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Figure 9 Revenue Growth ofAutomate 
In 1993，Automate increased the number of distributors from one to three, as a 
result, in that year, the revenue boomed by 2.5 times. This boom was a direct result of 
the release of suppressed demand due to the double marginalization problem induced by 
the monopoly status of Atoz. 
During 1994 and 1997, growth is due to both marketing and anti-piracy efforts. 
After opening a local office in Hong Kong, Automate is able to organize more pull 
marketing events. These events helped increasing demand on software as well as 
motivating users to upgrade from older releases to latest software release. 
Increased software demand, won't necessary convert to increased revenue, unless 
piracy rate is under control. Automate's anti-piracy campaigns, including advertisements, 
targeted warning letters and end-users raids, have been very successful during the pass 
few years. An average of 15% of Automate's revenue is the direct result of anti-piracy 
efforts, and over 30% ofnew software purchase are conversion of illegal software copies 
to legal licenses. 
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However, it is easily foreseeable that the growth rate started flattening since 1996, 
and the projected figure in 1998 is under 10%. There are two main causes for this 
declined growth. Firstly, due to the recent turmoil in the Asian economies, the 
architectural and construction market (major market of Automate) has shown an extreme 
downturn. Secondly, over 70% of large corporate have already "legalized" most of their 
illegal software copies, the rest of the pirating population is expected to be less sensitive 
to legal action, and thus require more efforts to persuade them to purchase legal copies. 
New Market Challenges 
Recent decline in macro economic environment would certainly shift Automate's 
demand curve downwards, companies would be less eager to expand their business scale. 
Moreover, given the adverse economic conditions, companies would be more concem 
about cost savings, and thus even they have to add more software licenses, they may start 
evaluating the actual need of their users and start looking for low end CAD replacements. 
As we mentioned in Chapter II，research and development cost of new software 
packages can be very low, thus entry barrier to the software market could be low. 
However, the volume of legacy data does serve as shield to new entrance's threat. In 
order to encourage users to switch to new CAD products, most of the new CAD products 
would provide files compatibility to leading CAD systems. One of Automate's 
competitors has just announced shipment of a low end CAD product, which costs only 
one-tenth ofAutomate's one, and claimed capable of fully read and write Automate files. 
The economy downturn, on the other hand, has also brought along new business 
opportunities. In order to increase efficiency and productivity, more and more companies 
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are planning to install computer-based management information systems. These systems 
can be classified into three groups, namely, workflow management, FM (Facilities 
Management) and GIS (Geographic Information System). The prime functionality of 
these systems is linking graphical data with textual attributes, and one of the pre-
requisites of implementing these systems is sufficient volume of electronic data. After 
more than ten years of using CAD software to prepare technical drawings, most of the 
maps and architectural plans were in electronic forms, as a result, making computer based 
management system possible. 
Product Line Extension 
In order to cope with the changing environment, Automate has to adjust its 
product offerings, so as to secure growth opportunities. For better understanding of the 
existing strategic position of Automate, we will apply the BCG model on Automate's 
products. 
From Figure 10，we can see that reasonable strategies of Automate would be 
prevent AutoDraw from dropping into the 'TX)G' category, while trying to upgrade GIS 
and FM related products to the “STAR，category. Thus resources should be allocated in 
maintaining AutoDraw's market position and upgrade rate, as well as promoting 
Automate's GIS and FM products. 
With the introduction of file compatible CAD competitors, Automate can no 
longer reply on legacy data as a protection shield, it must encourage users to develop 
more relation specific investments on Automate's products. One example of this would 
be the customized add-on modules using Automate's products. Moreover, Automate 
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should also promote uses of Automate's products to implement computer based GIS and 
FM systems. 
However, in order to support these new marketing strategies, better product 
support is required, with the existing level of services provided by resellers and dealers, 
these targets are difficult to achieve. 
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In this section, we will explore various channel strategies put forward by different 
economists and study whether new structures would be beneficial to Automate. As we 
have mentioned in earlier section, Automate faces two challenges, firstly, it has to 
prevent its flagship product AutoDraw from falling into a 'TX)G' product, secondly, it 
has to migrate the GIS and FM products to the “STAR，class. Besides channel structures, 
we will also discuss different pricing strategies. 
Economic Models 
We will begin our discussion with how to secure the position of Automate's 
flagship product AutoDraw in the market. Before we investigate the feasibility of various 
channel strategies, we would like to encapsulate the existing Automate virtual corporate 
with a simple model, in doing so, we try to increase our understanding on the problems. 
Certainly, Automate's bottom line is to maximize its profit, which can be 
represented by equation (1), 
Dm = Pd* Q d = P d * D ( P s , S) (1) 
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where Pd is distributor's price, Qd is quantity demand, D() is Automate's products demand 
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Figure 11 Economic Model ofAutomate's Virtual Corporation 
The profit of the distributor layer can also be represented by a similar equation, 
Hd = (Pr - Pd - 0,)* Qd = (Pr - Pd - 0, )* D(Ps, S) (2) 
where Pr is the dealer's price and ①！ is the in/out bound logistic costs. 
Finally, the profit made by dealers and resellers equals to， 
Ur = (Ps - Pr - 0( S))* Qd = (Ps - Pr _ � (S ) ) * Dr (P$, S) (3) 
44 
where � (S ) is the unit cost of provide a service level of S to customers, and Dr is the 
specific demand function they face. 
Taking partial derivatives of equation (1) against service, we have 
anm/as = Pd*5D(Ps, s)/ 5s � 
assuming that quantity demand increase with increased service level, we can see clearly 
from equation (4) that if 5D/5S is positive, given other things constant, Automate's profit 
would increase. In order to obtain a better understanding of the dynamics of these 
equations, we would first investigate how the equilibrium levels of street price (Ps) and 
service (S) are determined. 
As we have mentioned before, customers face a wide range of dealers, each 
offering them different level of services and charges different prices. The customers will 
surely buy from the one who offers them the most preferred price and services package. 
Thus, the optimal price and service mix would maximize customers' consumer surplus. 
Max CS(Ps, S) = r ° ° D ( x , S ) dx (5) 
Jp 
On the other hand, resellers would never do business that lose money, so another 
condition we have to consider is Ps > Pr + 0(S), or in a competitive environment, Ps = Pr 
+ 0(S). The first order condition for maximizing CS against service would then be, 
acs /as = laD/as(x,s) dx (6) 
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also, by envelope theorem, dCS/dS can also be written as 0,(S)D, thus, 
acs /as = o'(S)D = J aD/as(x,s) dx (7) 
The middle term of equation (7) is easy to interpret, the marginal cost of service 
times quantity demand, which would gives the cost of a unit increase in service level. 
The right hand side of equation (7) also gives the increase in marginal consumer surplus, 
which incorporates the increase in demand for all customers. This is an ideal picture for 
Automate, resellers invest in providing better services to customers, which increases the 
demand and satisfaction of all customers, and eventually shifting the whole demand 
function upward. However, the considerations of resellers may differ. 
Determination of Service Level 
According to Michael Spence^^ the competitive resellers would consider the 
reactions of its "marginal customerf before making a boost in service level. ''Marginal 
customed，here refers to those customers who are now indifferent of buying the product 
from one firm or elsewhere; buying that product or not buying at all. On the contrary, 
'iiframarginal customers” Kfers to those customers who has purchased the product 
already, who are royal to the product, and would continue buying the product even the 
service level changes. 
25 Spence, A.M., "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal ofEconomics, 1975, pp. 417-429. 
46 
Michael Spence argued that resellers may overprovide or underprovide services 
depending on marginal customer^ valuation of the increased service level. If marginal 
customers are more willing to pay for additional service than is the inframarginal 
customers, firms would overprovide services, in order to attract more new customers. 
The satisfaction of existing customer, the inframarginal customers, is actually out of the 
picture when resellers decide whether to increase service level or not. 
In reality, Automate's reseller channel provides a very low level of services to 
customers. The reasons can be summarized as follows. As we have mentioned in 
Chapter II, a large portion of Automate's customer are tied up by the huge volume of 
legacy data in hand, in addition, the investments in human resources also discourage 
them from switching to other applications. In this aspect, most of Automate's existing 
customers fall into the inframarginal category. 
Moreover, 5D/5S depends largely on the precision with which customers observe 
services provided by different resellers. As pointed out by David Dranove and Mark 
Satterthwite26, increase in service would bring in new customers only if marginal 
customers can appreciate the benefits of increased services. Currently, there is no 
independent resource that reviews service level provided by different resellers, unlike 
consumer products that have Consumer Council to publish unbiased reviews on, thus it 
would be very difficult for customers to judge the quality of services provided by 
resellers. As a result, customers can only rely on recommendations from peer customers, 
or focus on measurable attributes, like installation services, training and telephone 
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support. This explains why all resellers at least claimed that they provide some sort of 
support services, but the services are indeed of very low quality. Resellers who offer 
high quality services will benefit only if they can convince marginal customers of their 
superiority or can generate good word of month from existing customers, thus reward of 
increased investment in service is not obvious. 
Finally, Automate's marginal customers are usually small firms or individuals 
using illegal software. They are usually reluctant to pay high price for service, since they 
event don't want to pay for the software itself. The low reservation price that marginal 
customers are willing to pay for service would surely discourage competitive resellers 
from boosting up service level. 
To conclude, incentive for resellers to provide better service is low. 
Free Riding 
Even when the resellers are motivated by the manufacturer to boost up service 
level, the nature of software product itself would also discourage resellers from doing so. 
The reason is simply due to the horizontal externalities among dealers and resellers. 
Unlike other goods, support services of software cannot be appropriated to a particular 
piece of product. The service a reseller provides to a particular box of software would 
easily spill over to other copies. For example, if a company owns fifty copies of one 
particular software, but only purchase one copy from a service providing reseller. 
Whenever any of the fifty unsupported users encountered usage problem, he can still ask 
26 Dranove, D. and M. Satterthwaite, "Monopolistic Competition When Price and Quality are Not Perfectly 
Observable," RAND Journal ofEconomics, Winter 1992, pp. 518-534. 
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the reseller for support, and reseller have to serve him since the latter can never 
distinguish whether the user is using the copy he sold or not, and the solution is equally 
applicable to other copies. 
A dealer who invests and incurs the cost of providing better product support to 
end-users must charge a higher price than a retailer who does not provide support. 
However, end-users have the incentive of taking advantage of the former dealer by just 
purchasing only a minimal amount of products from them, and then purchase the rest 
from the latter at a lower price. In this case, some dealers can free-ride on the demand 
created by the increased level of support provided by other dealers, and this picture 
would not be possible if the dealers are monopolies, or if the manufacturer sells direct. 
Consider equation (3) again. A support providing dealer can only survive if (Ps -
Pr) > 0 ( S). However, since they are competing in a perfectly competitive market, it can 
easily been seen that Ps « Pr, in other words, (Ps - Pr) < 0 ( S), as a result, in the long run, 
no dealer would provide services at all. 
Following this conclusion, since 6D/5S is positive, if S deteriorates then demand 
of Automate's products as well as Automate's profit would also deteriorate. 
Channel Structure 
The horizontal externality among dealers and resellers is similar to a classical 
public-good problem, dealers just free-ride on each other. In order to encourage an 
adequate provision of services by dealers, this kind of unhealthy competition must be 
reduced or completely eliminated. To serve this proposes, there are two common 
competition-reducing restraints, namely retail price maintenance and exclusive territories. 
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Retail Price Maintenance 
Given such a small place as Hong Kong, exclusive territories is not quite feasible. 
On the other hand, RPM seems to be a good solution. In theory, the choice of Ps and Pr 
fixes the competitive level of services, which becomes 0(S) = Ps - Pr, with RPM, 
emergence of discount stores are prevented, users are encouraged to buy where the 
services are provided, since they are not able to shop for a better price elsewhere. 
However, with Automate's experience, simple RPM may not be enough. In 1996, 
Automate raised the price selling through resellers by 10% of the retail price, which 
effectively increased their street price by the same amount. As a result, the end-user 
price is maintained at a level of 25% discount. The annual results of 1996 and 1997 
showed that even with RPM, around 40% of the sales are still in resellers' hands, that 
means 40% ofthe users were buying at a premium, but receive no support services! This 
phenomenon reflects that either resellers have better market coverage or they have 
superior selling skills. 
Financial results of 1996 and 1997 showed that resellers are indispensable sale 
force in the virtual corporation, thus if Automate wants to drive demand upwards, simple 
RPM is not enough. Referring to equation (1), Automate can provide part of the service 
S. If the increase in quantity demanded by increasing Automate's service level out 
weights the additional cost incurred, then Automate should boost up its service level. 
Moreover, if Automate can find additional way to finance the spending on support 
service, then it should be better off. 
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Vertical Integration 
If Automate increase the distributor price, and re-invest the additional revenue in 
providing free support services to end-users, the value chain structure would then be re-
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Figure 12 Channel Structure After Vertical Integration 
The new setting can be considered as an un-bundling of service from the software 
product. The "product" part would continue to be sold through the existing dealer 
channel, while Automate would sell the "service" part directly, the cost of the "service" 
part would be charged to each user as a fixed per license royalty. Through un-bundling, 
the "product" part and "service" part should be considered as perfectly complementary 
goods. As Automate pushed up the street price by 10% in 1996, and still can maintain 
the same revenue level, 10% should be a good estimation of the price for the "service" 
part. 
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One of the draw back of un-bundling is losing the benefit of "one-stop" shopping. 
After the restructuring, users would have to obtain software and service from two 
different sources, this would be translated to additional cost to users. Since "service" 
itself exhibits free riding properties, the restructuring can be justified. 
Distributor's Role 
In the previous section, we arrived at the conclusion that Automate should 
provide direct product support to end-users, however, can Automate rely on distributors 
to provide this service instead? 
One possible proposal is to out-source the support function to distributors, and 
pay them in form of wholesale price discounts. The benefit of doing so is reduction in 
fixed overhead of Automate, and Automate can still maintain a thin company size. 
However, this plan also has drawbacks. First of all, since all end-users would be 
supported by this support center, thus this distributor would have access to all end-user 
information, and results in conflict of interest with other dealers and distributors. 
Secondly, the quality of service is relatively hard to maintain. 
Thus Automates should be better off, if it out-source the support service to an 
independent company, or provide the end-user support service directly. Direct user 
support is made possible by the recent advancement in Internet technologies, Automate 
can dissimulate information to and channel questions from end-user through low cost 
network media. 
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The Problem Child 
We have just addressed part of our mission, protecting AutoDraw's " C M I 
COW position. Next we will have to solve the GIS and FM product's 'TROBLEM 
CHILD，issue. 
After the vertical integration, Automate would be the provider of support services 
to end-users, and all dealers selling Automate's products would strip the support part and 
compete in a perfectly competitive manner. The dealers are not providing a full bundle 
of channel functions, as a result, the dealers won't be able to charge a premium on 
product selling and fund their investment on emerging market development. This give 
rise to a channel compensation problem. 
Under this situation, dealer motivation becomes a serious problem. As we have 
mentioned before, most dealers are also selling other computer products. Suppose now 
their margin on selling Automate's products is cut, they are very likely to over-allocate 
their resources to selling other products, where profit margin is higher. 
One common approach is to demarcate products by channels. Automate should 
restrict the sales of support intensive products, like the GIS and FM products, through 
only a few specific dealers. In this case, those privileged dealers would then be able to 
charge an abnormal margin, which serves as incentive for them to invest in developing 
these markets. 
Cournot Competition Among Distributors 
After we have completed our discussions on the dealer's level, we will continue 
our discussion with analysis on the distributor's level. According to economic theories, 
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the equilibrium industry output in a Cournot competitive environment does not maximize 
industry's profit, in other words, Automate's profit is not maximized. 
There are three competition structures that would induce higher profit to 
Automate, namely vertical integration, prefect competition and Bertrand's oligopolistic 
• 27 
competition . The main functions of distributors include, credit advancing and in/out 
bound logistics, and thus the economy of scale required in these three areas would 
prevent the distribution industry from developing into perfect competition. Moreover, 
this is not a preferred scenario for Automate, the greater the number of distributors to 
handle, the higher is Automate's administration cost. 
In addition, vertical integration by eliminating the distributor tier would involve 
daunting upfront investment and high risk of bad debts. As a result, a two-tier model 
doesn't seem like a good move for Automate. 
Bertrand competition on the other hand differs from Cournot in two basic 
assumptions. Bertrand's model assumes that competing firms are able to meet all the 
demand generated due to its price cut, however Coumot's model is constrained by the 
feature that capacities are fixed in the short run the equilibrium capacity is achieved in 
the long run. Moreover, in Coumot's model, firms are not able to "steal business" from 
others by directly controlling cutting price, since other competing firms would match by 
cutting price as well. Within Automate's virtual corporation, distributors do have limited 
capacities, which is the total credit they can give to dealers^^. It is also reasonable to 
27This model is proposed by J. Bertrand in 1883, which stated that competing firms would select a price to 
maximize its profit, based on their expectations on other firms price level. 
28lt would make business sense for distributors to increase dealers credit limit, with their profit margin fall 
below the cost of fund. However, they may wish to drive other distributors out of business by temporarily lowering 
their profit margin. 
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expect that price cut of one distributor can easily be matched by others. So, it is less 
likely that distributors' competition would develop into a Bertrand form. 
Following these arguments, Coumot competition is a better description of 
Automate's competitive environment. Then how can Automate maximize its interest? In 
general, the average percentage contribution margin of a firm competing in a Coumot 
environment is governed by PCM = H/r|, where H denotes the Herfindahl and r| is the 
price elasticity of demand. In this case, minimizing the PCM of distributors would 
maximize Automate's profit. One way to achieve this target is by reducing H, which 
means lowering the concentration ratio. Thus it would make more sense for Automate to 
maintain more distributors. 
However, as we have mentioned before, Automate cannot handle too large the 
number of distributors, thus the existing number of three distributors should be a good 
size. 
In order to maintain the existing balance, Automate should avoid Atoz from going 
out ofbusiness. One way to achieve this aim is to control the credit limit Automate give 
to each distributor. 
Pricing 
Besides maintaining the service level in the market, Automate also faces the 
constant challenge from piracy. The hard way to tackle this problem is by legal actions, 
but the soft way is to encourage users to forfeit their pirated software copies through 
trade promotions. Automate can employ two trade promotion strategies, either push or 
pull. By a push strategy, Automate offers incentives like trade discounts and bonus to the 
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dealer channel, and push them to promote Automate's products in the market. By a pull 
strategy, Automate offer incentives directly to end-users, including discount coupons, 
rebates and trade premiums to pull customers to purchase Automate's products. In this 
section，we will discuss each scenario in turn, and study what would be the best strategy 
for Automate, and for simplicity, we will not consider distributors in the model. 
Before we continue with our discussion, we will partition the market into two 
groups of users, referred as the "high"s and "low"s. The "high" segment is users who 
would have high opportunity cost in using pirated software, examples are government 
departments, utility companies and large corporations. On the other hand, the "low" 
segment are those uses who prefer using pirate copies, examples are small companies and 
factories in southern China. Since the majority of Automate's customers lie in the "high" 
segment, in order to sustain growth, Automate must expand sales in the "low" segment. 
Price promotions, no matter push or pull would be applied to both "high" and 
"low" segments, unless Automate can separate these two groups. In reality, some 
software manufacturers tried separating legal users and illegal users, then formulate 
specific promotion campaigns to target illegal users. In some cases, software companies 
provide special discounts to users who are willing to forfeit their pirated copies and then 
purchase legal software. However, these actions give rise to ethical issues. If special 
discount is only given to users using illegal software, then are software manufacturers 
encouraging users to use pirated software? Or encourage users to at least claim that they 
are using pirated copies? Obviously, these actions are unfair to users using legal copies. 
Instead of offering discount to encourage illegal users to purchase back legal licenses, 
software companies should charge them higher price as penalty, but obviously, this won't 
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be feasible in business context. Following this argument, we would assume that in 
practice Automate cannot partition the "low" and "high" segments of users, all trade 
promotion would be offered to both segments. 
Push Pricing Strategy 
Consider a typical push pricing strategy that the manufacturer offers a reduction 
in wholesale price. However, dealers' participation in passing this reduction or part of 
this reduction, to end-user is required in order to made the push strategy effective. 
Assuming that the "high" segment has a reservation price of Ph, while the "low" 
segment has a reservation price of P|. The highest price dealers can charge is Ph，so if 
dealers don't participate in the trade promotion and pocket whatever cost savings offered 
by Automate, they would just charge end-users Ph, and continue selling only to "high"s. 
In this case, Automate should set the wholesale price at Ph as well, so as to maximize its 
profit. 
In order to induce the "low"s to buy, the wholesale price should be set no higher 
than Pi, or if Automate wants to sell at a higher price, he must push up the reservation 
price ofthe "low"s, one way doing this is by using anti-piracy campaigns to threaten the 
"low"s and increases their cost of using pirated copies. 
Let a be the proportion of "high", then if dealers price the product at Ph, then their 
profits would be a(Ph - Pw) where P^ is the wholesale price. If dealers now decided to 
sell to all users, and charge a price of Pi, then the profit would be Pi - P^ So at what 
level of Pw will made the profit of dealers equal in both cases? Setting their profits in 
both cases equal, solving for Pw, we have, 
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Pw = (P i - aPh ) / ( l - a ) (8) 
The extra discount Automate has to offer is then equals to Ph - Pw = (Ph - Pi)/(1 - oc). 
Automate's profit would simply equals to Pw, while dealers' profit would be equal to Pi -
Pw = a(Ph - Pi)/(1 - a). Automate would prefer a trade discount if and only if the 
revenue obtained after the trade promotion is greater than selling to "high"s alone, i.e. 
aPh < (Pi - aPh )/(l - a), or 
P i > a ( 2 - a ) Ph (9) 
Pull Pricing Strategy 
Consider if Automate uses pull pricing strategy instead. Although dealers don't 
involve directly in the campaign, they still play a key role by reacting to the rebates 
offered by Automate. They may participate and set their price such that the "low"s would 
buy with the rebate, or they may object to the campaign by setting a price that only 
"high"s would buy. 
Suppose Automate now offers a rebate R, then the "high"s would buy if a price is 
set lower than Ph + R - T, where T is positive is the cost of "high" in redeeming the 
rebate. This redemption cost T is the result of the artificial barrier Automate setup to 
discourage the "high"s from using that rebate, in other words, T is the tool for 
discriminating between the "high"s and "low"s. For the "low"s, they would buy if the 
retail price is set at Pi + R. If dealers participate, then their profits would be Pi + R - Pw 
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or Pi + R - Ph as we have mentioned earlier Pw would be set by Automate at Ph in order to 
maximize its profit. On the other hand, if they don't participate, their profits would be 
a(Ph + R - T). 
What rebate should Automate offer if it wants its dealers to participate in the 
rebate program? The required rebate R can be obtained by setting the dealers profits of 
participating equals that of not participating, i.e. Pi + R - Ph = a(Ph + R - T). Solving for 
R, we have 
R = (Ph-Pi-aT) / ( l -a) (10) 
The retail price would then be Pi + R = Pi + (Ph - Pi - aT)/(l - a). The retail price 
must be higher than the wholesale price Ph, otherwise no dealer would sell the product. 
Thus, Pi + (Ph - Pi - aT)/(l - a) > Ph, rearranging, we have T < Ph - Pi. Automate's profit 
would equals to Ph - R, i.e. Ph - (Ph - P| - aT)/(l - a), or 
(Pi - a Ph)/(1 _ a) + aT/(l _ a) (11) 
"Push" or 'Tull" 
Since the first term in equation (12) equals to Automate's profit in a "push" 
pricing campaign, while the second term is either positive or zero, thus we can conclude 
that Automate always prefer "pull" strategy to "push" strategy. For this condition to be 
true, all users must buy from Automate after the trade promotion plan is implemented. 
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Moreover, the equations (9) and (10) must hold. Equation (9) is the condition under 
which "push" is preferred to the existing strategy (selling only to "high"s), while if 
equation (10) doesn't hold, retailers would not participate in the rebate campaign. 
Under these conditions, Automate would prefer a "pull” to "push" pricing 
strategy. Moreover, from the second term of equation (11), we notice that in order to 
maximize its profit, Automate would make T, the redemption cost, for the "high"s as 
larger as possible; in other words, Automate would make "highs”’ barrier of using the 
rebates as high as possible. 
There are a few campaigns that can increase the value of T. For example, 
Automate can offer first-time users a special discount, since the majority in the "high" 
segment is existing customers, they cannot enjoy this benefit. Moreover, Automate can 
take advantage of the budgeting cycle of large corporations and government departments. 
Special offers can be made, after large corporations and government department has 
submitted and approved their budget plans, say after April each year. Moreover, 
normally the sales to large corporations rises in the first quarter each year. The reason is 
quite simple, since the computer divisions of large corporations have to spend all their 
remaining budgets before the end of the current fiscal year. So, the second and third 
quarters of each year would be the tough of corporate sales. Since smaller companies are 
more flexible in budgeting, thus it would be easier for them to buy extra software than 
large corporations in response to sales promotions. 
Also, as we have mentioned before, Automate can offer special discounts to users 
who give in their pirated software. In this case, only small companies can enjoy the 
discount, because large corporations and government departments dare not admit that 
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they have been using pirated software. However, this kind of campaigns would involve 
ethical issues. 
Moreover, the smaller the rebate R, the less expensive is the rebate program to 
Automate. From equation (10), in order to reduce R, Automate can either increase T, or 
increase Pi, one effective way to push up Pi is by increasing anti-piracy efforts. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that, if Automate is to sustain its growth rate, a right channel 
restructure is critical. The major issue in Automate's channel is the low level of 
investment and product expertise, which result in a deteriorating support service level to 
end-users. The main reason behind this decline is identified to be dealer's free riding on 
the support services provided by other dealers. 
In order to boost up the service level, we would recommend Automate to increase 
the wholesale price of its software, and then provides product support services directly to 
end-users. In this case, supply of the public goods, "service" is ensured, and the problem 
of free riding is eliminated. 
Moreover, if Automate is to increase the demand of its software, we would 
recommend a "pull" pricing strategy instead of a "push" pricing strategy. A "pull" 
strategy would increase Automate's profit over a "push" strategy by an amount 
proportional to the redemption cost of the "high" segment in enjoying the trade 
promotion offered by Automate. The more expansive is the "high" segment's cost in 
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